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CURTAILING THE ECONOMIC DISTORTIONS
OF THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
William T. Mathias*
Many Americans consider the mortgage interest deduction a neces-
sary fixture of the American tax system. In this Article, Mathias
examines the economic underpinnings of the deduction and finds that
it cannot be justified on purely economic grounds. He then evaluates
the major policy arguments for the mortgage interest deduction and
concludes that it is inefficient, inequitable, and too costly in its
present form to be justified on policy grounds. Finally, the author
advocates for the elimination or substantial reduction in the size and
scope of the mortgage interest deduction.
The mortgage interest deduction generally allows taxpayers
to reduce their taxable income1 by the amount of interest they
pay on a home mortgage.2 A central policy objective of the
mortgage interest deduction is to promote home ownership.3
* B.A. 1990, Amherst College; J.D. 1996, University of Maryland School of Law.
Judicial Clerk to the Honorable Joseph H. Young of the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland. Prior to entering law school, the author worked as a
legislative assistant to United States Representative Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD),
member of the tax-writing Ways and Means Committee. The author would like to thank
Professor Daniel Goldberg for his comments on and criticisms of the Article.
1. Taxable income is the amount of income on which one must pay taxes. The
starting point for computing an individual's tax liability is gross income. The Internal
Revenue Code defines gross income expansively to include "all income from whatever
source derived." I.R.C. § 61 (1994). For most taxpayers gross income consists of wages,
dividends, and interest. The Code excludes from gross income certain enumerated
sources of income, known as exemptions. See id. §§ 101-153. Next, the Code allows
taxpayers to reduce gross income by subtracting certain expenditures, known as deduc-
tions. See id. §§ 161-220. In subtracting deductions, taxpayers have the option of either
taking a standard deduction, which is an amount set by Congress, or itemizing their
deductions. See id. § 63. To take advantage of the mortgage interest deduction, taxpayers
must itemize their deductions and not use the standard deduction. See id. § 63(d). The
amount that remains is an individual's taxable income. See id. § 63. The appropriate
rate schedule is then applied to taxable income to arrive at the individual's tax liability.
See id. § 1. See generally MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: A GUIDE
TO THE LEADING CASES AND CONCEPTS 1-7 (7th ed. 1994) (summarizing the process of
calculating taxes).
2. Not all home mortgage interest may be deducted. See infra notes 17-35 and
accompanying text. This Article generally uses the term "mortgage interest." However,
this type of interest is also known as "qualified residence interest." I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A).
3. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 263-64 (1987) ("[E]ncouraging home ownership is an
important policy goal, achieved in part by providing a deduction for residential mortgage
interest."); S. REP. No. 99-313, at 804 (1986) (same); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 297 (1985)
(same).
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Considering that the mortgage interest deduction is one of the
most costly provisions in the Internal Revenue Code,4 we should
examine just what the American taxpayers will get for the more
than $300 billion5 this nation will spend on the mortgage
interest deduction over the next five years.
This Article begins with an explanation of the parameters of
the mortgage interest deduction under current law. Part II
introduces the concept of imputed rent, which is essentially the
rent a homeowner would pay to live in her house if she did not
own it. This Part then explores the extent to which the mortgage
interest deduction is required under a broad economic definition
of income, as opposed to the Code's definition of taxable income,6
and finds that under an economic definition of income the mort-
gage interest deduction is appropriate only if imputed rent is
included as income.
Part III provides a discussion of whether the government
should promote home ownership, the effectiveness of the mort-
gage interest deduction in encouraging home ownership, and the
various drawbacks associated with the mortgage interest deduc-
tion. The Article contends that the mortgage interest deduction,
particularly in its present incarnation, provides too much benefit
to upper-income homeowners and too little to low- and middle-
income renters who desperately want to become homeowners.
Instead of increasing the rate of home ownership, the mortgage
interest deduction exacerbates the inequalities resulting from
not including imputed net rent in taxable income. The mortgage
interest deduction also creates serious economic distortions that
stymie economic growth and make our economy run less effi-
ciently.
Finally, Part IV analyzes the various options for eliminating
or reducing the mortgage interest deduction. The Article con-
cludes that the only effective way to eliminate the inequalities
4. Each year the federal government analyzes how much various provisions of the
Code cost in terms of lost tax revenue. This analysis is referred to as the Tax Expendi-
ture Budget (TEB). For 1996, the TEB estimated the major tax expenditures to be: (1)
exclusion of employer-provided medical insurance, $66.6 billion; (2) exclusion of
employer-provided pension contributions, $59 billion; and (3) mortgage interest
deduction, $54.2 billion. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGE-
MENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: ANALYTICAL
PERSPECTIVES 64 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 BUDGET]. Over the next five years, the TEB
estimates that the major tax expenditures will be: (1) exclusion of employer-provided
medical insurance, $398 billion; (2) mortgage interest deduction, $303 billion; and (3)
exclusion of employer-provided pension contributions, $300 billion. See id.
5. See id.
6. See supra note 1.
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related to the tax treatment of housing is to include imputed net
rent as taxable income and allow a deduction for mortgage
interest as an expense of earning the imputed rent. Unfortu-
nately, the administrative complexities associated with taxing
imputed rent raise serious doubts about whether Congress will
ever enact this complete solution. While recognizing the limita-
tions inherent in any partial solution, this Article suggests the
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction or, at the very
least, its substantial reduction.
I. THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION
UNDER CURRENT LAW
From the inception of the income tax in 19137 until the
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the 1986 Tax Act),8 the
general rule was that a taxpayer could deduct all personal
interest payments, including interest payments on home mort-
gages.9 The early legislative history of the Code provides little
insight into why Congress provided a deduction for all personal
interest, let alone interest on home mortgages. 10
In the 1986 Tax Act, Congress changed the treatment of
interest by eliminating the deduction for "personal interest.""
7. Tariffof 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, § 657,38 Stat. 114, 167(1913) ("[Iun computing
net income for purpose of the normal tax there shall be allowed as deductions ... all
interest paid within the year by a taxable person on indebtedness . . ").
8. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
9. The Code restates this underlying principle as the general rule that all interest
is deductible. See I.R.C. § 163(a) ("There shall be allowed as a deduction all interest paid
or accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness."). Deductions are items that the
Code allows a taxpayer to subtract from gross income to arrive at taxable income. See
supra note 1; see also DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 4.0000 (3d ed. 1994).
10. See John Y Taggart, Denial of the Personal Interest Deduction, 41 TAX LAW.
195, 198 (1988) ("[T]here is nothing in the Code's early legislative history to suggest why
Congress allowed the deduction in the first place . .. ").
11. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2246-48 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)). The 1986 Tax Act was developed from a report by the
Treasury Department advocating overhauling the tax system. See 1 OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY, DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH; THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 83 (1984).
While the Treasury Department Report was otherwise comprehensive, it did not propose
elimination of the mortgage interest deduction. See id. Charles E. McLure, Jr., who had
primary responsibility for developing the Treasury Department Report, characterized
the omission as "[tihe single most important defect" of the report. Charles E. McLure,
Jr., Where Tax Reform Went Astray, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1619, 1651 (1986). McLure points
FALL 19961
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The 1986 Tax Act defined personal interest to include all
interest payments by a noncorporate taxpayer, except for inter-
est on debt allocable to a trade or business, investment interest,
interest deductible under the passive activity rules, interest on
unpaid estate tax liability, and qualified residence interest.12
Congress justified its decision to eliminate the deduction for
personal interest as an effort to "eliminate[] from the present
tax law a significant disincentive to saving."13 It explained that
the pre-1986 tax system "provide[d] an incentive to invest in
consumer durables rather than assets which produce taxable
income and, therefore, an incentive to consume rather than
save." 4 Congress was particularly troubled by the incentive the
Code provided for debt-financed consumer purchases.'" Use of
credit cards and other consumer credit sources to buy luxury
items such as cars, vacations, and jewelry as well as personal
consumption needs such as food, clothing, and home appliances
meant less money was available to invest in businesses and
other income producing sources. The exception for qualified
residence interest thus represented an explicit recognition by
Congress of the important policy goal of encouraging home
ownership.'"
A "qualified residence" 7 is the taxpayer's principal residence
and one other residence which the taxpayer selects and uses as
a residence for a portion of the year.'8 The term "qualified
out that this omission was a purely political decision in response to President Reagan's
remark to members of the National Association of Realtors, see id., that the home
mortgage interest deduction was "off limits" for tax reform. See id. As another commen-
tator put it, the Reagan administration promised to "preserve that part of the American
dream which the home mortgage interest deduction symbolizes." Stanley A. Koppelman,
Tax Arbitrage and the Interest Deduction, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143, 1155 n.45 (1988)
(quoting 23 TAX NOTES 678 (1984)).
12. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2).
13. S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 804 (1986).
14. Id.
15. See 2 BORIS I. BIrTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME,
ESTATES AND GIFTS 31.5, at 31-73 (2d ed. 1990) ("The personal interest rule was
enacted because an unlimited deduction for personal interest was thought to provide
an unwarranted incentive for debt-financed consumer purchases.").
16. Gf supra note 3.
17. I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(A).
18. See id. The Code does not require the taxpayer to reside in the second residence
if it is not rented to another party at any time during a taxable year. See id.
§ 163(h)(4)(A)(iii).
Taxpayers use the second residence deduction most frequently for vacation homes,
but boat owners have argued successfully that the term "residence" includes a home at
sea. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, 17.04, at 166; Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual
Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH.
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residence interest"19 refers to interest on a debt that is either
"acquisition indebtedness"" or "home equity indebtedness"2 with
respect to the taxpayer's "qualified residence."22
"Acquisition indebtedness" is debt incurred in acquiring,
constructing, or substantially improving a qualified residence
of the taxpayer.23 To qualify, the debt must be secured by a
qualified residence. 24 Refinanced acquisition indebtedness also
qualifies for the mortgage interest deduction, but only up to the
unpaid principal of the old mortgage prior to the refinancing.2"
Borrowing against the unrealized appreciation on a qualified
residence, on the other hand, does not qualify as acquisition
indebtedness.26 A taxpayer may not deduct interest on more
than $1 million of acquisition indebtedness. 2' The limitation
does not apply to debt incurred before October 14, 1987, and
secured by a qualified residence regardless of the actual use of
the loan proceeds.2"
"Home equity indebtedness" is debt that a taxpayer normally
incurs after acquiring a home. Like acquisition indebtedness, it
must be secured by a qualified residence.2 9 The amount that a
taxpayer may borrow as home equity indebtedness may not
exceed the difference between the fair market value of the
qualified residence and the taxpayer's acquisition indebtedness
& LEE L. REv. 459, 487 (1993). Consequently, the interest on a loan used to purchase
a boat is deductible so long as the owner of the boat resides on it for the greater of 14
days or 10% of the number of days the boat was rented. See I.R.C. § 280A(d)(1) (stating
the 14 day/10% definition for using a dwelling unit as a residence).
19. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A).
20. Id. § 163(h)(3)(B).
21. Id. § 163(h)(3)(C).
22. Id. § 163(h)(3). For an overview of these terms, see 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 15, 31.5; CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, at 31-73 to 31-80, 7.04, at 164-69;
DOUGLAS A. KAHN, FEDERAL INCOME TAX: A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE §§ 5.1320-5.1700 (3d ed. 1994).
23. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B).
24. See id.
25. See id. In practice, this limitation prevents a homeowner who has repaid a
portion of his mortgage from taking advantage of the mortgage interest deduction a
second time by borrowing back the amount repaid. For example, if the taxpayer incurs
$100,000 of acquisition indebtedness in acquiring a residence and pays down the debt
to $75,000, then the taxpayer's acquisition indebtedness for the residence cannot be
increased above $75,000 by refinancing or otherwise. See generally CHIRELSTEIN, supra
note 1, 7.04, at 165; Joseph A. Snoe, My Home, My Debt: Remodeling the Home
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 80 KY. L.J. 431, 445 (1992).
26. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, 7.04, at 165. But see infra notes 29-35 and
accompanying text (discussing home equity indebtedness).
27. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii).
28. See id. § 163(h)(3)(D)(i).
29. See id. § 163(h)(3)(C)(i).
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on the residence.3" Thus, home equity indebtedness allows the
taxpayer to borrow against the equity that has built up in a
residence through repayment of the original mortgage principal
or through appreciation in the value of the residence.31 The Code
limits the total amount of home equity indebtedness a taxpayer
may incur to $100,000.32 The limitation does not apply to debt
incurred before October 14, 1987, and secured by a qualified
residence. In contrast to acquisition indebtedness, the Code
imposes no limitations on the use of the proceeds of home equity
indebtedness.34 Therefore, a taxpayer can use the proceeds of a
loan to meet personal consumption needs and deduct the inter-
est simply by using his residence as security for the loan.35
In summary, then, the home mortgage interest deduction
allows taxpayers who itemize their deductions to deduct the
interest on loans of up to $1 million used to acquire or improve
a primary or secondary home and an additional $100,000 used
for any purpose. The Code provides no similar deduction for any
other type of consumer interest.
II. IMPUTED RENT AND THE HAIG-SIMONS
DEFINITION OF INCOME
Although it may be impossible to agree on a comprehensive
definition of income," a general understanding of the concept
of income is required to evaluate specific Code provisions that
cause exclusions, inclusions, and deductions from income in
calculating the income tax.37 In fact, a leading economist has
30. See id.
31. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, 7.04, at 165.
32. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii). Thus, a taxpayer can deduct the interest on loans
totaling $1.1 million (including acquisition indebtedness).
33. See id. § 163(h)(3)(D)(i).
34. See id. § 163(h)(3)(C).
35. See 2 BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 15, 31.5, at 80; CHIRELSTEIN, supra note
1, 7.04, at 165.
36. See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME
AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY 43 (1938) ("That it should be possible to delimit the
concept [of income] precisely in every direction is hardly to be expected.").
37. See Richard Goode, The Economic Definition of Income, in COMPREHENSIVE
INCOME TAXATION 1, 2 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977) ("A good definition of income is
an indispensable intellectual foundation for the evaluation of an income tax statute....
Without such a basis, discussion is likely to be unnecessarily discursive and the ad hoc
conclusions reached may lack force.").
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stated that "construction of a fair income tax is well-nigh
impossible without the guidance of a basic income concept."38
The most widely supported definition of income among Ameri-
can tax specialists is the Haig-Simons definition, also referred
to as the accretion concept or the economic definition of in-
come.39 Under the Haig-Simons definition, personal income
equals the sum of increase in net worth and consumption.4 ° Net
worth consists of all receipts, including cash and the fair market
value of property, that increase worth, regardless of the source.4
Consumption is defined expansively to cover all expenditures,
including in-kind consumption, except those incurred as a cost
of earning or producing income.
4 2
Uinder the Haig-Simons definition of income, personal income
should include the imputed net rental value of an owner-
occupied house4 3 because a house is a capital asset that provides
a return to the homeowner in the form of rent-free housing. To
understand this benefit more clearly, remember that a home-
owner could convert this asset into cash by moving and renting
the house to someone else who would pay rent in cash.44 Seen
38. Richard A. Musgrave, In Defense of an Income Concept, 81 HARV. L. REV. 44,
44 (1967).
39. See Goode, supra note 37, at 2.
40. Robert Murray Haig defined income as
the increase or accretion in one's power to satisfy his wants in a given period in
so far as that power consists of (a) money itself, or, (b) anything susceptible of
valuation in terms of money. More simply stated, the definition of income which
the economist offers is this: Income is the money value of the net accretion to one's
economic power between two points of time.
Robert Murray Haig, The Concept of Income-Economic and Legal Aspects, in THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1, 7 (Robert Murray Haig ed., 1921). Likewise, Henry C. Simons
defined personal income for tax purposes as
the algebraic sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in consumption and
(2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between the beginning
and end of the period in question. In other words, it is merely the result obtained
by adding consumption during the period to 'wealth' at the end of the period and
then subtracting 'wealth' at the beginning.
SIMONS, supra note 36, at 50.
41. See SIMONS, supra note 36, at 61; see also Goode, supra note 37, at 7-20.
42. See SIMONS, supra note 36, at 61; see also Goode, supra note 37, at 15-17.
43. Both Haig and Simons explicitly stated that imputed income, in particular the
imputed rent on owner-occupied houses, should be included in personal income. See
Haig, supra note 40, at 14; SIMONS, supra note 36, at 112.
44. See generally RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx 120-21 (1964)
(discussing imputed rent of owner-occupied houses); Richard Goode, Imputed Rent of
Owner-Occupied Dwellings Under the Income Tax, 15 J. FIN. 504 (1960) (same).
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from a slightly different perspective, imputed net rental value
is the amount a homeowner would have to pay to live in the
house if she did not own it.4" Imputed net rent is calculated by
estimating the gross rent that the house would obtain in an
arm's length market rental agreement,46 and then reducing the
gross rent by the expenses incurred in producing the income,
namely mortgage interest, property taxes, depreciation, repairs
and maintenance, and casualty insurance.47
If the definition of gross income included the imputed net
rental value of an owner-occupied house, then mortgage interest
would be deductible as an expense of producing the rental
income. The government has acknowledged that in a pure
income tax, gross income would include imputed net rent from
an owner-occupied house.48 Nevertheless, the government
traditionally has excluded imputed income from consumer
durable goods (such as an owner-occupied house) from gross
income. Although the language of the Code appears to include
such imputed income in the definition of gross income,49 the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has never attempted to include
such imputed income in the tax base."° This decision has been
justified as responding to concerns about valuating such imputed
income, constitutional questions, and worries that taxpayers
would consider the concept unusual and too theoretical.5'
Proponents of the mortgage interest deduction argue that the
deduction corrects for the horizontal inequities52 between cash
45. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, 1.03; Melvin White & Anne White, Horizontal
Inequality in the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Homeowners and Tenants, 18 NAT'L
TAX J. 225, 228 (1965).
46. See William F. Hellmuth, Homeowner Preferences, in COMPREHENSIVE INCOME
TAXATION 163, 169 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977).
47. See GOODE, supra note 44, at 121.
48. See Office of Management and Budget, Special Analysis G: Tax Expenditures,
Special Analyses, Budget of the United States Government (1984), reprinted in MICHAEL
J. MCINTYRE ET AL., READINGS IN FEDERAL TAXATION 161-62 (2d ed. 1983) ("If the
reference tax is a pure income tax, the mortgage interest deduction would not be treated
as a tax expenditure. Instead, there would be a tax expenditure based on the exemption
of the imputed rent from the owner-occupied home, adjusted for depreciation."); see also
S. REP. No. 99-313, at 804 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 297 (1985).
49. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (1994) (defining "gross income" as "all income from whatever
source derived").
50. See CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 1, 1.03.
51. See id.
52. Horizontal equity or fairness is generally defined as equal taxation of taxpayers
with equal income. See Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (1989).
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home buyers and mortgage home buyers.53 When income
does not include net imputed rent, cash buyers have an advan-
tage over mortgage buyers because mortgage buyers must pay
taxes on the interest on their mortgages while cash buyers have
no mortgage interest on which to pay taxes. The net result is
that a mortgage buyer has to pay more than a cash buyer for
the same home because of taxes.
The mortgage interest deduction is also touted as preventing
an inequality from developing between homeowners who own
businesses and those who do not.54 Because the Code provides
a deduction for interest allocable to a business,55 a business
owner could avoid any limitations on the deductibility of
mortgage interest by borrowing against her business to pay for
her home. 6 Here is how it would work: The owner of a business
would borrow $100,000 from a bank and use her equity in her
business as collateral for the loan. She would then use the
$100,000 to pay for her home. The interest she would pay on the
loan would be deductible because the loan is secured by the
business and thus allocable to the business. Thus, even though
the loan was used essentially as a mortgage, the interest would
be deductible. Persons who do not own businesses, on the other
hand, would not have a similar method of deducting the interest
on their mortgages and would be at a disadvantage compared
to business owners if the mortgage interest deduction were
limited.57
Finally, proponents of the mortgage interest deduction charge
that it eliminates inequalities between first-time home buyers
and long-time homeowners. First-time home buyers borrow a
larger percentage of the total cost of their homes than previous-
owner buyers.58 In addition, in the early years of a typical home
mortgage, a large percentage of the loan payments are interest
as opposed to principal. Absent the mortgage interest deduction,
long-time homeowners have a tax advantage over first-time
home buyers. Because first-time home buyers generally have
53. See Susan E. Woodward & John C. Weicher, Goring the Wrong Ox: A Defense
of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 301, 302 (1989).
54. See Gene Steuerle, Limits on the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 58 TAX
NOTES 787 (1993).
55. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(2)(A) (1994).
56. See Steuerle, supra note 54, at 787.
57. See id.
58. See Woodward & Weicher, supra note 53, at 312 (noting that first-time buyers
borrow slightly more than 90% of the value of their homes, while previous-owner buyers
borrow only about 80% of the value of their homes).
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mortgages with higher loan-to-value ratios and larger interest
payments in the early years, they have more taxable income
without a mortgage interest deduction and pay more taxes than
long-time homeowners whose mortgages have lower loan-to-
value ratios and smaller interest payments.59
Unfortunately, allowing a deduction for mortgage interest but
not including imputed net rent in the definition of income
exacerbates the horizontal inequities caused by not including
imputed net rent in the definition of income in the first place.6 °
The Code produces an inequality between owner-occupiers and
renters.61 Renters cannot deduct their cash rental payments and
thus pay taxes on the income they use to meet their housing
costs. 62 Meanwhile, owner-occupiers do not include the imputed
rental value of their homes as income and thus do not pay tax
on the imputed income they use to meet their housing costs.
63
In addition, owner-occupiers can deduct certain expenses of
earning the imputed rent, such as mortgage interest. 64 The
mortgage interest deduction thus further disadvantages renters
compared to owner-occupiers.
The Code also produces an inequality between owner-occupiers
and other investors. 65 Owner-occupiers have a tax advantage
because they are not taxed on either the imputed rental income
or the income used to pay the mortgage interest on their invest-
ment in their house. Real estate investors, on the other hand,
must pay tax on the rental income they receive on their invest-
ments in rental properties, 66 although they can deduct the
mortgage interest as a business expense.67 Similarly, those who
invest in other income-producing assets must pay taxes on the
income they receive from their investments, and they can deduct
the income used to pay the investment interest to the extent of
investment income.
59. See Goode, supra note 44, at 514-15.
60. See Snoe, supra note 25, at 464-74 (describing the inequalities that result from
allowing the mortgage interest deduction).
61. See Goode, supra note 44, at 505-06 (giving an example of the discrimination
against renters and in favor of owner-occupiers).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.; see also Snoe, supra note 25, at 467-68.
65. See Goode, supra note 44, at 506; see also infra notes 95-97 and accompanying
text.
66. See I.R.C. § 61 (1994).
67. See I.R.C. § 163.
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In the end, the current tax system departs from the Haig-
Simons definition of income by providing a deduction for mort-
gage interest 68 without correspondingly including the imputed
net rental value of owner-occupied houses. From a structural,
economic perspective, the mortgage interest deduction is "not
warranted."6 9 Any attempt to justify the mortgage interest
deduction, therefore, must rely solely on policy grounds.
III. POLICY ARGUMENTS
A. To Subsidize Home Ownership or Not?
Many consider home ownership to be at the heart of the
American Dream. For generations, presidents have extolled the
virtues of home ownership.7 ° National housing policy recognizes
the importance of having a home.71 Congress has stated directly
that "encouraging home ownership is an important policy goal."72
68. The Code additionally provides a deduction for real property taxes, see I.R.C.
§ 164(a)(1), the impact of which is analogous in many ways to the mortgage interest
deduction. An extended discussion of the merits of the real property tax deduction is
beyond the scope of this Article. For that discussion, see generally JB McCombs,
Refining the Itemized Deduction for Home Property Tax Payments, 44 VAND. L. REV. 317
(1991).
69. JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 94 (5th ed. 1987); see also William
J. Turnier, Personal Deduction and Tax Reform: The High Road and the Low Road, 31
VILL. L. REV. 1703, 1708 (1986).
70. See President William J. Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation on the Economic
Plan (Feb. 27, 1993), in 29 WKLY. COMPILATION PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 331, 332
(1993) (stating that home ownership is "an essential part of the American dream we're
working hard to restore"); President George Bush, Remarks on Arrival in Appleton,
Wisconsin (July 27, 1992), in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES: GEORGE BUSH, 1992-93, at 1188, 1188 (1993) ("I believe that those on welfare,
what they really want is a piece of the American Dream: home ownership, a good job,
opportunities for their children, and strong, loving families."); President Ronald Reagan,
Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of the National Association of Realtors (May 10, 1984),
in I PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: RONALD REAGAN, 1984,
at 675, 677 (1986) ("I firmly believe that the opportunity to own a home is part of the
American Dream."); President Lyndon Johnson, Crisis of the Cities, Message from the
President of the United States (Feb. 26, 1968), in 114 CONG. REC. 3956, 3957 (1968)
("Home ownership is a cherished dream and achievement of most Americans.");
President Franklin Roosevelt, Address to the United States Savings and Loan League
(Nov. 16, 1942), quoted in Home Owners Hailed in Roosevelt Note, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17,
1942, at 35 ("[A] nation of home owners, of people who own a real share in their own
land, is unconquerable.").
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) ("The Congress declares that the general welfare
and security of the Nation and the health and living standards of its people require...
the realization as soon as feasible of the goal of a decent home and a suitable living
environment for every American family . . ").
72. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 804 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 297 (1985).
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Despite such widespread political support, the basic concept
of home ownership is not without its critics. Socialists oppose
the gentrification of society and the buildup of wealth that they
believe home ownership exacerbates; 73 pure free-market econo-
mists argue that government preferences for home ownership
lead citizens to divert resources from their most productive uses,
thereby reducing economic efficiency and retarding economic
growth.74
Supporters of home ownership tout a number of advantages
that they believe accrue to individual homeowners and to
society as a whole from home ownership. The underlying prem-
ise is that individuals who own their own home have a vested
financial interest in their home and the surrounding community
and will take a greater interest therein. Individual benefits
include increased stability and security, better neighborhood
environments, and nicer housing.75 Home ownership also gives
individuals enhanced social and financial status, and greater
investment potential if houses appreciate in value. 76 From a
broader societal perspective, home ownership better preserves
the housing stock through more thorough maintenance of
homes by owner-occupants.77 Proponents of home ownership
73. See, e.g., Jim Kemeny, A Critique of Homeownership, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
ON HOUSING 272 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 1986).
74. See WILLIAM VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 23-24 (1947);
Hellmuth, supra note 46, at 192 ("In terms of economic efficiency and the allocation of
resources, too little capital is invested in areas other than housing and too much in
housing."); Joseph Isenbergh, The End ofIncome Taxation, 45 TAX. L. REV. 283, 306-07
(1990) ("I believe there has been a slower rate of economic growth ... as a result of
overinvestment in housing."); McCombs, supra note 68, at 326-27 (discussing the
economic disincentives that result from encouraging home ownership).
75. Professor JB McCombs states:
Numerous social benefits are believed to flow from home ownership. Homeowners
move less often than renters. Parents may be induced to take a greater interest
in the school system. Voter turnout and other forms of local political involvement
increase. Owners maintain their homes better than renters and landlords, thus
providing aesthetic benefits to neighbors. Better maintenance of homes also
supports local real estate prices, thereby likely increasing motivation of nearby
owners to improve and maintain their property and motivation of lenders to
finance such activities.
McCombs, supra note 68, at 325-26 (footnotes omitted). See also Julia P. Forrester,
Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Government's
Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 406 (1994); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L.
REV. 973, 1007 (1986).
76. See Forrester, supra note 75, at 407; Zelinsky, supra note 75, at 1007-08.
77. See Forrester, supra note 75, at 407; Zelinsky, supra note 75, at 1007-08.
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also argue that society benefits from increased savings by
homeowners" and more wealth accumulation by homeowners
who can build up equity in their homes as they pay their
mortgages.79 Finally, home ownership contributes to stronger
communities because homeowners have a vested interest in
their communities and thus are more responsible and involved
citizens.80
In reality, though, the disadvantages of home ownership
outweigh the advantages, which are largely illusory. Little
empirical evidence supports the individual psychological benefits
often attributed to home ownership." Moreover, home ownership
has significant disadvantages. From an economic perspective,
home ownership reduces the efficiency of the economy. A home
is an illiquid asset. Selling a home takes time and involves costs
such as sales commissions and, possibly, the realization of a
taxable gain. 2 In addition, if an individual chooses to purchase
a replacement home, then she must incur additional costs in
the form of closing costs and points 3 on her mortgage loan.
These costs erode the value of a homeowner's investment in her
home. Moreover, if the value of the home has fallen, selling the
home results in a loss that is not deductible 4 and so further
reduces the investment.8 5 Home ownership also impairs mobili-
ty of the labor force.8 6 The lack of liquidity of homes and the
78. See Forrester, supra note 75, at 406. But see Isenbergh, supra note 74, at
306-07 (suggesting that housing is a poor vehicle for savings and investment because
the savings, in the form of unrealized appreciation, are not in a readily invested form).
79. Savings and wealth accumulation are also bolstered by the fact that a home,
normally the largest asset an individual owns, cannot be easily converted into cash for
consumption spending.
80. See Forrester, supra note 75, at 407; Zelinsky, supra note 75, at 1007-08.
81. See HENRY J. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDY: WHO BENEFITS FROM FEDERAL
HOUSING POLICIES? 70 (1972) (referring to "the alleged, but unsubstantiated, benefits
accruing to the community when households come to own their own homes"); GOODE,
supra note 44, at 127 ("[Tlhe nature of the social advantages claimed for [home
ownership] is somewhat vague.").
82. The Code provides that a taxpayer may defer any gain from the sale of a home
if the taxpayer buys a new home of at least equal value within two years. See I.R.C.
§ 1034(o) (1994). In addition, the Code provides a one-time exclusion of up to $125,000
of gain from the sale of a home for taxpayers who are age 55 and older. See id. § 121.
83. With respect to home mortgages, the term "points" refers to a fee mortgage
lenders charge home buyers at the inception of mortgage loans. A point equals one
percent of the principal amount of the loan and is in addition to the stated rate of
interest on the loan. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990).
84. See I.R.C. § 165.
85. See Forrester, supra note 75, at 407.
86. But see Richard E. Slitor, Rationale of the Present Tax Benefits for Homeowners,
in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 163, 165-67 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985)
(arguing that home ownership does not impair mobility because of improvements in the
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costs associated with selling them can cause workers to become
fixed in a geographic area that does not have adequate job
opportunities when it would be more economically efficient for
the workers to move to other areas with more job opportuni-
ties.87 The impaired mobility of the labor force thus causes the
economy to run less efficiently.
Additional economic costs associated with promoting home
ownership result from the preference of homeowners for low
density single-family homes. 8 The construction of additional
single-family homes leads to increased infrastructure costs be-
cause more roads, sewers, and utilities must be built.89 In
addition, owner-occupied homes are generally larger then rental
units, requiring increased energy usage because these larger
homes must be heated, air conditioned, and lit.90
Governmental measures designed to promote home ownership,
such as the mortgage interest deduction, also impose significant
costs on society through higher tax rates, which negatively affect
the economy.9' The government's support of home ownership
reduces the price of home ownership compared to rental housing
and other nondurable goods.92 It also increases the net rate of
return on investment in owner-occupied housing above that of
other income-producing investments.
These economic effects seriously distort the housing market. 94
Because rental housing is paid for with after-tax dollars,
liquidity in the real estate market and the nonrecognition of capital gains on the sale
of a home if the taxpayer reinvests the proceeds).
87. For example, the recession that hit New England in the early 1990s may have
been exacerbated by the excess workers who could have found jobs in other parts of the
country but remained in the New England area because they owned homes that they
were unable to sell. See The Boom That Busted, ECONOMIST, Jan. 25, 1992, at 23
(discussing the effects of the recession in New England in the late 1980s); Michael J.
Mandel, Bummed-Out in America: Why Do Consumers Feel So Badly-And What Will
Snap Them Out of It?, Bus. WK., Mar. 16, 1992, at 34 (indicating that the recession
caused the average sale price of new homes to fall 8% with much steeper drops in the
hardest hit areas of the country such as New England).
88. Approximately 90% of owner-occupied houses are single-family homes. See U.S.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 737 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
89. See Forrester, supra note 75, at 408.
90. See id.
91. See id. (arguing that the mortgage interest deduction and other tax provisions
favoring home ownership impose greater societal costs than any other governmental
policy promoting home ownership).
92. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
93. See Hellmuth, supra note 46, at 189-90; see also supra notes 65-67 and
accompanying text.
94. See Harold A. McDougall, Affordable Housing for the 1990's, 20 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 727, 749 (1987) ("The mortgage interest deduction skews national investment
drastically toward owner-occupied housing-at the expense of investment in more
socially productive uses.").
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owner-occupiers enjoy an advantage because neither imputed
net rent nor mortgage interest is taxed.95 In this way, the
mortgage interest deduction initially reduces the cost of home
ownership compared to rental housing. This reduction in the
cost of home ownership increases demand for owner-occupied
housing. As demand increases, it begins to outstrip the supply
of owner-occupied housing and causes the price to rise. As the
price rises, demand falls. Over time, the mortgage interest
deduction will result in an artificially high long-run equilibrium
price for owner-occupied housing.96
On the other side of the equation, the increase in the cost of
rental housing and the increase in demand for owner-occupied
housing initially reduces demand for housing. The result is an
initial oversupply of rental housing. The excess supply of rental
housing leads to a reduction in rental housing construction and
a drop in the price of rental housing. As the price falls, demand
begins to rise. Over time, the government subsidies for home
ownership will lower the long-run equilibrium price for rental
housing, reducing the supply of rental housing below the level
it otherwise would have been without government subsidies for
home ownership.9
The conversion of middle-income tenants into homeowners
that results from government subsidies of home ownership also
distorts the rental market. From a landlord's perspective the
"desirability" of tenants presumably is proportional to their
income.98 Consequently, a loss of middle-income renters reduces
the quality of tenants in the rental market, which, in turn,
makes rental properties less attractive to investors. As investors
lose interest in rental properties, the supply of rental units
shrinks. With fewer rental units and a lower proportion of
middle-income tenants, the quality of rental units tends to
worsen. Moreover, the price of the remaining rental units tends
to rise because of the decrease in the supply of rental housing
and the need for a higher rate of return to induce investors to
invest in rental housing.99
95. See supra Part II.
96. See Hellmuth, supra note 46, at 190.
97. See id. In fact, the supply of available rental units has shrunk in recent years.
See Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory ofRetroactive Legislation, 61 TEx. L. REV. 425,453-54
(1982); Peter W. Salsich, Jr., A Decent Home for Every American: Can the 1949 Goal Be
Met?, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1619, 1634 (1993).
98. See McCombs, supra note 68, at 326 ("One might surmise that the desirability
of tenants increases with their income.").
99. See id.
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Government support for home ownership also increases the
rate of return on investments in owner-occupied housing com-
pared to other investments, which leads to an inefficient alloca-
tion of resources in the economy. Economists theorize that if all
economic resources were allocated to the various segments of the
economy in the proper proportions then the economy would run
at peak efficiency; this situation is known as the optimal market
allocation of resources. °° By artificially inflating the rate of
return on investments in owner-occupied housing, the govern-
ment diverts resources from their optimal market allocation.
Investors place too much capital in owner-occupied housing and
too little in other segments of the economy.101 At present, nearly
one out of every three dollars of net private investment goes
toward owner-occupied housing,1 2 thereby driving up the cost
of capital in other segments of the economy. 13 This misallocation
of resources causes the economy to run less efficiently and stifles
economic growth. 104
The misallocation of resources into housing also has an impact
on our balance of trade. Because housing is a fixed asset that
cannot be exported, the expansion of the housing segment of the
economy occurs at the expense of other, potentially exportable,
segments of the economy. Through this diversion of resources,
incentives to increase home ownership negatively impact our
balance of payments with other countries. 05
100. See Francis M. Bator, The Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization, 47 AM.
ECON. REV. 22 (1957) (providing in Part I a rigorous technical discussion of the "best"
configuration of inputs, outputs, and commodity distribution). Over the years, a dispute
has arisen between economists over the extent to which an optimal market allocation
of resources is achievable. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 197 (1962)
("[Tihe difference between the actual operation of the market and its ideal operation...
is as nothing compared to the difference between the actual effects of government
intervention and their intended effects."). But see Zelinsky, supra note 75, at 996 ("[Tjhe
model of perfect competition is an obviously inaccurate description of the contemporary
American economy."); ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 424,461 (Edwin Cannan
ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776) ("In every country it always is and must be the
interest of the great body of the people to buy whatever they want of those who sell it
cheapest. The proposition is so very manifest, that it seems ridiculous to take any pains
to prove it . . ").
101. See Hellmuth, supra note 46, at 190.
102. See U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, REDUCING THE DEFICIT: SPENDING
AND REVENuE OPTIONS 342 (1995) [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
103. See McCombs, supra note 68, at 326 (asserting that government programs that
make home ownership easier also raise "capital costs to other sectors of the economy");
CBO REPORT, supra note 102, at 342 ("[Elven a modest reduction in housing investment
could raise investment significantly in other sectors.").
104. See McCombs, supra note 68, at 326.
105. See id.
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A final, though somewhat recondite, argument challenges the
economic underpinnings of preferring owner-occupied housing
to rental housing. Specialization and economies of scale are
central to increasing economic efficiency. Landlords, as special-
ists in providing housing, would likely provide housing at a
lower cost than owner-occupants. 1°' Why, then, should the gov-
ernment promote a less efficient means of providing housing?
B. How to Subsidize Home Ownership
Most Americans want to own their own home. According to
two recent studies, 86% of Americans believe that home owners
are better off than renters 10 7 and 80% of Americans identified
the traditional single-family home with a yard as the ideal place
to live.0 8 Although the author does not concede that the govern-
ment should play a role in subsidizing home ownership, such
high levels of public support for home ownership, suggest that
continued government support for home ownership may be
inevitable. The question, then, is whether the mortgage interest
deduction is the best and most efficient way for the government
to promote home ownership.
At present, the federal government promotes--or, more
accurately, subsidizes-home ownership through myriad tax
expenditures and direct spending programs. Direct federal
spending on housing assistance amounted to almost $23.9 billion
in Fiscal Year 1996.109 As Table 1 indicates, 10 the major tax
expenditures designed to benefit homeowners are the mortgage
interest deduction,"' the property tax deduction," 2 deferral of
capital gains,' 1 3 and the one-time exclusion of capital gains." 4
Together these provisions of the Code caused an additional $92.6
106. See Goode, supra note 44, at 127; see also Isenbergh, supra note 74, at 307
(arguing that organizing multi-unit dwellings as condominiums and cooperatives rather
than as apartments is economically inefficient).
107. See FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 1994, at 10.
108. See James W. Hughes & Todd Zimmerman, The Dream is Alive, 15 AM.
DEMOGRAPHICS 32,34-35 (1993) (citing FANNIE MAE, FANNIE MAE NATIONAL HOUSING
SURVEY 1992).
109. See 1996 BUDGET, supra note 4, at 88.
110. See infra tbl. 1.
111. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994).
112. See id. § 164(a)(1).
113. See id. § 1034.
114. See id. § 121.
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billion in lost revenue in Fiscal Year 1996.115 Not even consid-
ered as part of the tax expenditure budget is the failure to tax
imputed net rent from owner-occupied housing. 6 As Table 1
demonstrates, 117 the mortgage interest deduction is the largest
single federal expenditure (tax or otherwise) on housing." 8 In
addition, the public widely perceives it as providing the most
encouragement to home ownership."19
Public perception may not coincide with economic reality.
Assuming that the goal of the mortgage interest deduction is to
expand the rate of home ownership, how effectively has it
achieved this goal? In the decades that followed World War II,
the rate of home ownership grew, although in recent years that
growth has plateaued. In 1940,44% of all dwellings were owner-
occupied. 120 By 1960, the number had risen to 62%.121 In 1993,
the number was 65%.122 Although the mortgage interest deduc-
tion may have played a role in encouraging home ownership, a
number of other factors also contributed to the increase in home
ownership, including the rise in real income, gains realized by
debtors during an inflationary period, and the movement of
population away from central cities toward the suburbs.
123
If the mortgage interest deduction has contributed to rising
rates of home ownership, who has it helped? Or, in tax policy
parlance, does the deduction create vertical inequities? 124 Under
the current tax system, the benefits of the mortgage interest
deduction vary directly with the taxpayer's income and marginal
115. See 1996 BUDGET, supra note 4, at 40.
116. See supra Part II. The U.S. Department of Commerce estimated that the
annualized rental value of owner-occupied housing was $438 billion in 1992. See 1995
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 458. This figure represents roughly 7% of the
nation's $6 trillion gross domestic product. See id. at 452. To arrive at imputed net rent,
the Department of Commerce estimate of the rental value of owner-occupied housing
must be reduced by mortgage interest and property taxes. This means that taxable
income was understated by almost $400 million in 1992.
117. See infra tbl. 1.
118. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
119. See Cheryl D. Block, Personal Deductions Under the Bradley-Gephardt Fair Tax
Act: Necessary Departures from the Ideal?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 921, 952 (1985) ("[T he
middle class ... relies so heavily on the home mortgage deduction.").
120. See 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 733. The 1940 percentage
may be unusually low because of the effect of the Great Depression. See GOODE, supra
note 44, at 126.
121. See 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 733; see also GOODE, supra
note 44, at 126.
122. See 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 733.
123. See GOODE, supra note 44, at 126.
124. Vertical equity concerns the relative tax burdens placed on taxpayers with
different incomes. For a complete discussion, see Shaviro, supra note 52, at 1222.
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tax rate, the market value of the taxpayer's house, and the size
of the mortgage compared to the value of the house.'25 To
illustrate the correlation between the benefit of the mortgage
interest deduction and marginal tax rates, consider two taxpay-
ers, U (upper-income taxpayer) and L (lower-income taxpayer),
who each pay $10,000 in mortgage interest. If U is in a 40% tax
bracket, she would have to pay $4000 in taxes (40% of $10,000)
if she could not deduct the $10,000 she paid in mortgage inter-
est. Meanwhile, if L is in a 20% tax bracket, he would have to
pay $2000 in taxes (20% of $10,000) if he could not deduct the
$10,000 in interest he paid on his mortgage. Accordingly, the
mortgage interest deduction is worth $4000 to the upper-income
taxpayer, but only $2000 to the lower-income taxpayer.
This vertical inequity between upper- and lower-income
taxpayers is heightened because upper-income taxpayers gener-
ally own more expensive homes with larger mortgages than
lower-income taxpayers. Consequently, upper-income taxpayers
pay more mortgage interest and get a larger benefit from the
mortgage interest deduction. To illustrate this idea, again
consider two taxpayers, U and L, who each pay 10% interest on
their respective mortgages. U has a palatial home with a
$500,000 mortgage and thus pays $50,000 in mortgage interest
(10% of $500,000).126 Assuming that U is still in the 40% tax
bracket, she would have to pay $20,000 in taxes (or 40% of
$50,000) if she could not deduct mortgage interest. Meanwhile,
L has a more modest home with a $100,000 mortgage and pays
only $10,000 in mortgage interest (10% of $100,000). Assuming
L is still in the 20% tax bracket, he would have to pay $2000 in
taxes (20% of $10,000) if mortgage interest was not deductible.
Therefore, in this hypothetical the mortgage interest deduction
is worth $20,000 the upper-income taxpayer but only $2000 to
the lower-income taxpayer.
These two hypotheticals show that upper-income taxpayers
receive a greater proportion of the subsidy from the mortgage
interest deduction than lower-income taxpayers. In fact, a
study of tax receipts from 1988 found that more than 50% of
the tax savings from the mortgage interest deduction accrued
125. See Hellmuth, supra note 46, at 194; see also GOODE, supra note 44, at 127
(noting that "[tihe present provisions afford assistance for housing and home ownership
that varies directly with the family's income and marginal tax rate").
126. For simplicity's sake, the hypothetical ignores the effects of amortization, which
would cause the mortgage payments in the early years of the mortgage to reflect a large
percentage of interest and only a small percentage of principal.
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to taxpayers with incomes in the ninety-first percentile or
higher. 127 The mortgage interest deduction, thus, is an upside-
down subsidy.128 In other words, it creates significant vertical
inequities between upper-income taxpayers, who benefit greatly
from the deduction, and lower-income taxpayers, who benefit
only slightly if at all.
It is unclear how a program that provides the majority of its
benefits to the richest people in the country129 furthers the
stated policy goal of "encouraging home ownership."'3 ° It is
difficult to conceive of a defense for a direct spending program
that would pay nearly 40% of the cost of a second home for a
millionaire while providing no benefit to the average family
making less than $42,500.131
In sum, the vertical inequities associated with the mortgage
interest deduction make it a poor tool for encouraging lower- and
middle-income people to move from renting to home owner-
ship.'32 Instead, a significant portion of the benefit of the
mortgage interest deduction subsidizes the purchase of larger
homes for the wealthy.
C. The Real Estate Market,
Personal Wealth, and Capitalization
Given the failure of the mortgage interest deduction as a tool
for encouraging home ownership among lower- and middle-
127. See JAMES M. POTERBA, TAXATION AND HOUSING: OLD QUESTIONS, NEW
ANSWERS 5 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3963, 1992).
128. See STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 36 (1973) ("[T]he wealthier the individual the greater is his assistance
under the program.").
129. Cf McMahon, supra note 18, at 486 ("[Tlhe current [mortgage interest]
deduction goes far beyond what is necessary to fulfill the publicly stated goal of the
defenders of the home mortgage interest deduction-to make the American dream of
home ownership available to the average American.").
130. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 804 (1986); H.R. REP. No. 99-426, at 297 (1985); see also
supra note 3 and accompanying text.
131. A 1988 study using an economic model suggested that the mortgage interest
deduction was essentially "worthless" to a married couple with two children making less
than $42,500 with a typical loan-to-value ratio mortgage, due in large part to the value
of the standard deduction. See James R. Follain & David C. Ling, The Federal Tax
Subsidy to Housing and the Reduced Value of the Mortgage Interest Deduction, 44 NAT'L
TAX J. 147, 152-53 (1991).
132. Cf McCombs, supra note 68, at 329 ("A [tax] subsidy achieves its goal only with
those recipients who are at the margin between following or rejecting the subsidized
path.").
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income Americans, do other reasons justify retaining the deduc-
tion? Supporters of the mortgage interest deduction point to the
size of the residential real estate market 3 3 and charge that
eliminating the deduction would have a devastating effect on the
construction and real estate industries, the banking industry,
personal wealth, and the economy as a whole.
134
The exact size of the impact on the economy of the mortgage
interest deduction and other federal tax expenditures intended
to promote home ownership is difficult to determine. Professor
Henry Aaron suggests that federal tax expenditures may have
increased housing consumption by as much as twenty percent. 135
He attributes the increase in housing consumption to an expan-
sion in the number of people who own homes and the value of
the homes people own.136 Others, however, suggest that federal
tax expenditures have affected only the choice between home
ownership and renting rather than expanding total consumption
of housing services.'37
A related concern is whether the subsidy provided by the
mortgage interest deduction is capitalized 138 into the market
price of a house.139 If the tax subsidy is capitalized, then elimi-
nating the mortgage interest deduction would precipitate a
corresponding erosion in the value of owner-occupied housing.
To illustrate how capitalization works, consider a home worth
$80,000 without reference to the mortgage interest deduction.
If the capitalized value of the mortgage interest deduction on
that home is $20,000, then the home would sell for $100,000 if
133. In 1984, total home mortgages outstanding were estimated at $1.3 trillion,
which is almost 45% of the outstanding debt held by individuals. See Koppelman, supra
note 11, at 1155 n.44 (citing BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., BALANCE
SHEETS FOR THE U.S. ECONOMY 1945-84 (Oct. 1985)).
134. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 96-99 (2d ed. 1995);
see also DATA RESOURCES INC./McGRAw-HILL, RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE IMPACTS ON
FLAT TAX LEGISLATION, May 1995 (DRI Analysis Summary Prepared for the National
Association of Realtors) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
[hereinafter DRI ANALYSIS].
135. See AARON, supra note 81, at 62; cf Woodward & Weicher, supra note 53, at
312 (arguing that elimination of the mortgage interest deduction would raise the present
value cost of a house by about 20%).
136. See AARON, supra note 81, at 61.
137. See, e.g., GOODE, supra note 44, at 125.
138. Capitalization occurs when the tax benefit accorded an item is factored into the
item's market price. See generally Boris I. Bittker, Tax Shelters and Tax Capitalization
or Does the Early Bird Get a Free Lunch?, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 416 (1975) (discussing the
concept of capitalization).
139. See McMahon, supra note 18, at 486 n.144 (suggesting that the tax benefit of
the mortgage interest deduction is mostly capitalized into the cost of a home).
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the mortgage interest deduction were capitalized in the price.
Assume that a taxpayer buys the home for $100,000. If the
mortgage interest deduction is eliminated the next day, then the
value of the home drops to $80,000 because the $20,000 capital-
ized value of the mortgage interest deduction becomes $0.
Because a house is the largest asset owned by most Americans,
any significant erosion in the value of owner-occupied housing
would have a corresponding impact on personal wealth.
While there seems to be general agreement that some portion
of the mortgage interest deduction is capitalized into the market
price of owner-occupied housing, there is no agreement on the
extent to which the deduction is capitalized.14 ° The market has
trouble distinguishing between taxpayers who receive different
levels of benefit from the mortgage interest deduction based on
their marginal tax rate and so the market price for housing
tends to reflect the highest benefit received from the deduc-
tion." Under such an assumption, the mortgage interest
deduction is over-capitalized for some taxpayers, 42 and eliminat-
ing the deduction will cause a larger price adjustment than
otherwise would have been expected.
Nevertheless, any overcapitalization should be limited to the
margins between tax brackets. The housing market is sophisti-
cated;143 it generally responds quickly and efficiently to changes
in mortgage rates, taxes, and other market conditions. Real
estate brokers, mortgage lenders, and even home buyers and
140. See Follain & Ling, supra note 131, at 162-64 (discussing variations in the level
of benefit from the mortgage interest deduction, thus demonstrating, unintentionally,
the potential for capitalization across various incomes and tax brackets). Compare DRI
ANALYSIS, supra note 134, at 3-4 (arguing that eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction would cause a 15% reduction in the value of homes), with STEPHEN ENTIN,
DRI STUDY DISTORTS FLAT TAX IMPACT ON HOME PRICES, (Institute for Research on the
Economics of Taxation, IRET CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY, Aug. 31, 1995) (suggesting that
the value of homes would drop far less). '
141. Cf Shaviro, supra note 52, at 1238 (discussing how the benefits of realization
vary over a particular group).
142. See id.
143. See Perry J. Woodward, Comment, Intentional Interference with Prospective
Economic Advantage: A Tort That Eviscerates the Real Estate Brokers'Statute of Frauds,
36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1219, 1255 (1996) (noting that according to some experts real
estate brokers in today's market must negotiate with "sophisticated" consumers who
often are in "superior bargaining positions") (citation omitted). See generally William
N. Eskridge, Jr., One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules
Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan
Transaction, 70 VA. L. REV. 1083, 1112-28 (1984) (examining the dynamics of mortgage
transactions and consumer decisionmaking by home buyers).
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sellers closely monitor tax changes affecting real estate.144 In
addition, a fairly close correlation exists between mortgage
amount, home price, income of the buyer, income of the seller,
and therefore their marginal tax rates. For instance, the buyer
of a $400,000 home will most likely be in the top marginal tax
bracket and will finance roughly the same portion of the pur-
chase price as the seller of the home did. Therefore, both the
buyer and seller will receive about the same benefit from the
mortgage interest deduction, and any capitalization of the
deduction will properly reflect the benefit conferred on the two
parties. If, however, the buyer is not in the top marginal tax
bracket or makes a large down payment to reduce the size of the
mortgage, then the mortgage interest deduction likely will be
overcapitalized. The extent of such overcapitalization should be
limited to buyers near the margins between the tax brackets.
IV. POLICY OPTIONS
A. Include Imputed Net Rent in the Tax Base
Once the problems caused by the mortgage interest deduction
are identified, eliminating it might seem the simplest and best
solution, yet eliminating the mortgage interest deduction with-
out including imputed rent in income gives cash home buyers
a tax preference over mortgage home buyers.145 The only way to
eliminate all horizontal inequities created by the current tax
system 146 is to include imputed net rent as taxable income.
147
Unfortunately, the administrative complexities associated with
valuating imputed net rent pose a substantial impediment to
including it in the tax base. 4 ' As one tax reformer bluntly put
144. See Eskridge, supra note 143, at 1086 (suggesting that many home buyers "defer
to more sophisticated intermediaries" such as home builders, real estate brokers, and
lenders); Reid Breitman, Note, Equating California Foreclosure Sales with Ordinary
Residential Sales, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 947, 972-73 (1995) (asserting that the average
home buyer is not sophisticated and, instead, relies on real estate brokers and other
professionals to assist them).
145. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also Snoe, supra note 25, at
466-67 (providing an illustration of the tax advantage that accrues to cash home
buyers).
146. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
147. See GOODE, supra note 44, at 128.
148. A 1977 tax reform proposal drafted by the Treasury Department's Tax Policy
Staff did not include imputed rent from owner-occupied housing in its tax base due in
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it, "simplification will not be served by taxing imputed rent, no
matter what method is used."14 On the other hand, the adminis-
trative difficulties associated with taxing imputed income are
not novel. Appraisals of homes are conducted on a fairly
frequent basis for property taxes and mortgage loans. 50 in addi-
tion, a number of foreign countries have experience taxing
imputed net rent. 5' Thus, the government could calculate the
imputed rental income.' 52
In the final analysis, the only effective means of eliminating
all horizontal inequities from the tax system is to tax imputed
net rent and allow mortgage interest to be deducted as an
expense of earning the imputed rent. Any other change will
produce horizontal inequities. Unfortunately, the perceived
administrative difficulties involved in taxing imputed net rent
make it unlikely that Congress will ever adopt such a propos-
al,' 5 ' so we must turn to other alternatives.
large part to concerns about administrative complexity:
[T]o tax this form of imputed income, however desirable it might be from the
standpoint of equity or of obtaining neutrality between owning and renting, would
severely complicate tax compliance and administration .... Even if market rental
were estimated, perhaps as a fixed share of assessed value of the dwelling, the
taxpayer would face the difficulties of accounting for annual maintenance and
depreciation to determine his net income.
DAVID F. BRADFORD & U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY TAX POLICY STAFF, BLUEPRINTS FOR
BASIC TAX REFORM 78 (2d ed. rev. 1984). One of these difficulties involves distinguishing
the costs of repairs and maintenance, which would be deductible, from the costs of
capital improvements, which would not. Another difficulty arises because it is all but
impossible to distinguish between repairs related to imputed rent and repairs that
constitute personal consumption. For example, how would the Code deal with an owner-
occupant who painted every two years when a landlord would only paint every five
years? See Jerome Kurtz, Comments to Hellmuth, Homeowner Preferences, in COMPRE-
HENSIVE INCOME TAXATION 197, 200 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1977).
149. Kurtz, supra note 148, at 198.
150. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-1412a (1989) (ordering county and district
appraisers to perform annual appraisals of real estate for purposes of assessing property
taxes); MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 8-104 (1994) (mandating the valuation of real
property over a three-year cycle for purposes of assessing property taxes); 12 C.F.R.
§ 34.43 (1996) (requiring appraisals for certain real estate loans by national banks).
151. As of the middle of the 1970s, 42 of the world's 115 income tax systems
subjected imputed rental income from owner-occupied residences to a tax. See Paul E.
Merz, Foreign Income Tax Treatment of the Imputed Rental Value of Owner-Occupied
Housing: Synopsis and Commentary, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 435, 435 (1977). Some of these
countries, however, no longer include imputed net rent in their tax base. See id. at 436.
152. For example, the government could use direct estimates or take a percentage
of the home's value or the owner's equity in the home. See GOODE, supra note 44, at 129.
153. See HENRY J. AARON & HARVEY GALPER, ASSESSING TAX REFORM 90 (1985)
("The practical problem is that estimating a market rent for tax purposes would be
inexact and open to challenge.").
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B. Eliminate the Mortgage Interest Deduction
1. Under the Current Tax System-Given the administrative
complexities associated with including imputed net rent in the
definition of income, the next best option is to eliminate the
mortgage interest deduction completely. As discussed above, the
mortgage interest deduction is too large, too ineffective, and
creates vertical and horizontal inequities. Moreover, eliminating
the mortgage interest deduction would raise an estimated $313.3
billion in revenue over five years.'
Eliminating the mortgage interest deduction would have a
positive economic impact because most, if not all, of the revenue
raised by eliminating the deduction should be funneled back to
taxpayers through a reduction in overall tax rates. The reduc-
tion in tax rates would lead to a reduction in interest rates and
an increase in economic growth.'55
Another economic advantage of eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction is that owner-occupied housing would no
longer enjoy a tax preference over other investment opportuni-
ties. Equalizing the rate of return on investments from a tax
perspective should reduce or eliminate the overconsumption of
housing. Theoretically, capital would flow freely to its optimal
market allocation. The economy would run more efficiently and
grow faster.'56
2. Under a Flat Tax-The arguments in favor of eliminating
the mortgage interest deduction are even more persuasive in the
context of a comprehensive restructuring of the tax system, such
as a broad-based flat tax.157 First, a larger portion of the revenue
154. See CBO REPORT, supra note 102, at 342.
155. See ENTIN, supra note 140, at 2.
156. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
157. Historically, there has been strong support for eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction in the context of comprehensive tax reform. In 1975, the Commission to Revise
the Tax Structure estimated that eliminating the mortgage interest deduction in the
context of sweeping tax changes to broaden the tax base and reduce tax rates would
cause a small reduction in residential construction that would eventually be offset by
the larger flow of capital to business investment. See Hellmuth, supra note 46, at 169
(citing COMMISSION TO REVISE THE TAX STRUCTURE, REFORMING THE FEDERAL TAX
STRUCTURE 35, 140 (1973)). Similarly, in 1972, noted economist Henry Aaron proclaimed:
"Complete reform in tax treatment of homeowners seems the most attractive course,
particularly if it were combined with overall tax reduction to offset the increases
homeowners would experience." AARON, supra note 81, at 73. In addition, he argued that
such reform "would cause the personal income tax to generate substantially larger
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raised by eliminating the mortgage interest deduction will likely
be used to reduce overall tax rates because a primary political
goal of a flat tax is to reduce tax rates, which will create tremen-
dous political pressure to use the revenue to reduce rates rather
than fund additional spending programs. Moreover, individuals
who support a flat tax often also oppose big government,1
8
meaning that if Congress enacts a flat tax, it likely will also
support reducing the size of government. Second, the reduction
of marginal tax rates that would accompany the adoption of a
flat tax would erode the value of the mortgage interest deduc-
tion, even if the deduction were retained. For example, consider
the effect a modified 20% flat tax which retained the mortgage
interest deduction would have on a taxpayer in the top marginal
tax bracket'59 who pays mortgage interest of $10,000. Under the
current tax system, such a taxpayer saves $3960 in taxes (39.6%
of $10,000) by deducting the interest she pays on her mortgage.
Under a modified 20% flat tax, the mortgage interest deduction
would have a value of only $2000 (20% of $10,000).160 A change
to a flat tax would eliminate roughly half of the value of the
mortgage interest deduction without any change in the mortgage
interest deduction.
These benefits aside, eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction would cause some negative effects on the residential
real estate market. First, it would directly affect those taxpayers
who currently take advantage of the deduction, because they
would no longer have the benefit of the deduction and would
have to pay taxes on their mortgage interest. This change would
raise the cost of owning a home for these taxpayers. Second, the
value of owner-occupied housing would decrease.' 6 ' The size of
revenues, which could support direct expenditures for housing or other purposes,
reductions in tax rates, or lowering of interest rates." Id.
158. For example, a leading proponent of a flat tax in the House of Representatives
is Congressman Dick Armey (R-TX). See, e.g., Howard Gleckman, Tax Reform is Coming,
Sure. But What Kind?, Bus. WEEK, Jun. 12, 1995, at 84. As the Republican Majority
Leader, he is also a vocal proponent of reducing the size of the federal government. See
Phil Kuntz, Crowning a Cannon, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3782, 3782 (Dec. 12, 1992)
(indicating that Congressman Armey "quickly established himself within the House
GOP's bomb-throwing set with acerbic attacks on left-leaning Democrats, pedantic
lectures on the virtues of free markets and 'budget commando' raids aimed at reducing
federal expenditures" and thus the size of the federal government).
159. See I.R.C. § 1(c) (1994) (setting the highest marginal rate at 39.6%).
160. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
161. See DRI ANALYSIS, supra note 134, at 3-4 (suggesting that the average
homeowner would lose 15% of the value of her home within two years). But see ENTIN,
supra note 140, at 1 (arguing that the DRI Analysis "grossly exaggerated" the effects
of a flat tax).
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the reduction in value would depend upon the extent to which
the mortgage interest deduction is already capitalized into the
price of owner-occupied housing.162
These negative effects of eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction could be mitigated, at least in part. The elimination
of the mortgage interest deduction would not directly affect
homeowners with older mortgages and small amounts of out-
standing, principal because their interest payments have dwin-
dled.163 Homeowners with adjustable rate mortgages would see
their interest rates decline, which would offset the loss of the
mortgage interest deduction. 164 Additionally, many homeowners
with fixed rate mortgages would be able to refinance their
mortgages to take advantage of lower interest rates.
165
Finally, a study of the effects of the 1986 Tax Act shows that
a reduction in the value of owner-occupied housing may not have
the devastating effects that some have predicted.'66 In 1986, a
reduction in marginal tax rates and an increase in the standard
deduction sharply reduced the value of the mortgage interest
deduction."' The magnitude of the reductions in value were
largest among middle-income taxpayers (see Table 2). One would
expect such a large reduction in the value of the mortgage
interest deduction to devastate middle-income taxpayers, yet
numbers of home mortgage defaults do not appear to have
increased appreciably during this period.168 Thus, it seems that
homeowners were able to compensate for the reductions in the
value of the mortgage interest deduction.
162. See supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text.
163. See Richard L. Doernberg, A Workable Flat Rate Consumption Tax, 70 IOWA
L. REV. 425, 479 (1985).
164. Proponents of the flat tax claim that it would "pull down interest rates
immediately." See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 134, at 80. With adjustable rate
mortgages, commonly referred to as ARMS, the interest rate on the mortgage fluctuates
during the life of the loan, usually annually, based on prevailing interest rates. See
FANNIE MAE FOUNDATION, CHOOSING THE MORTGAGE THAT'S RIGHT FOR YOU 14-15
(1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Consequently,
lower prevailing interest rates would translate into lower mortgage interest rates and
lower payments for homeowners with ARMS, thereby offsetting the loss of the mortgage
interest deduction. See HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 134, at 82-85.
165. See Doernberg, supra note 163, at 479; see also ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN
RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAx, FLAT TAX 60-66 (1983).
166. See Follain & Ling, supra note 131, at 164-65.
167. See McDougall, supra note 94, at 751.
168. According to federal statistics, the percentage of mortgage loans delinquent 30
days or more was 5.8 in 1985, 4.7 in 1990, and 4.1 in 1995. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 515 (1996). The percentage of
mortgage loans in the foreclosure process at year end was 1.0 in 1985, 0.9 in 1990, and
0.9 in 1995. Id.
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Despite all of these factors mitigating the effects of eliminat-
ing the mortgage interest deduction, some segments of the
population would feel the elimination of the mortgage interest
deduction more than others. Younger, first-time home buyers
would suffer substantially from eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction because they receive substantial benefit from
the mortgage interest deduction. On average, first-time home
buyers have the highest loan-to-value ratios among homeowners
and a higher percentage of their mortgage payments in the early
years is interest as opposed to principal. 6 ' On a positive note,
though, younger home buyers have more years to benefit from
the stronger economic growth that eliminating the mortgage
interest deduction promises to produce, and eventually they
should recoup the lost value of the mortgage interest deduction.
Older, long-time homeowners, on the other hand, have built
up significant equity in their homes and often plan to draw off
that equity to live during their retirement years. Consequently,
longtime homeowners would feel little of the direct effects of
eliminating the mortgage interest deduction, but they would feel
the loss of value of owner-occupied housing. 7 ° Stronger economic
growth should eventually make up for the loss in value in the
residential real estate market. Unfortunately, older longtime
homeowners have less time to benefit from economic growth.
Accordingly, some transition rules would be necessary in the
short run to mitigate the negative effects of eliminating the
mortgage interest deduction.'71 Ideally, transition rules should
169. See supra text accompanying note 59.
170. See Deborah H. Schenk, The Effect of a Broad-Based Flat-Rate Income Tax on
the Average Taxpayer, 23 TAx NOTEs 423, 432 (1984) ("[E]limination of the deduction
can be expected to depress the value of residential property which... could be a major
setback for the elderly or those about to retire . . . ."). Statistics raise some questions
about whether many older people do, in fact, sell their homes and live off the built-up
equity. In 1994, home ownership rates were highest among people aged 65 to 69 at
80.6%. See 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 736. There is only a small
reduction in ownership rates among the upper age groups. In 1994, people aged 75 and
older had a home ownership rate of 73.5%, higher than the home ownership rate for any
age group under age 45. See id.
171. There is significant dispute in the academic community over whether taxpayers
who entered into mortgages with sizable interest payments on the assumption that those
payments would be deductible deserve transition relief based on their reliance. See
generally Daniel S. Goldberg, Tax Subsidies: One-Time vs. Periodic; An Economic
Analysis of the Tax Policy Alternatives, 49 TAX. L. REv. 305 (1994) (criticizing Professors
Graetz and Kaplow's arguments that transition relief is not necessary); Michael J.
Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 47, 87 (1977) ("When a provision has outlived its usefulness, it should be
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reduce windfall gains and losses without creating additional
inequities or complexity.' 72 Direct spending programs designed
to benefit first-time homebuyers could address the effects of
eliminating the mortgage interest deduction on first-time home
buyers, 73 but the loss in value suffered by longtime homeowners
is best addressed through transition rules. The options for
transition rules are a grandfather clause to protect existing
homeowners for ten to twenty years,'74 or a phase-in period of
perhaps ten years.'75
Grandfathering the mortgage interest deduction creates
several new problems and does not address the loss-of-value
problem adequately.' 6 A grandfather clause would not protect
owners of existing homes against the loss in value of their
homes because potential buyers, who would not have the benefit
of the mortgage interest deduction, would be unwilling or unable
to pay the owner's value for a home.'77 Furthermore, an expan-
sive grandfathering clause would severely limit the revenue
gains from eliminating the mortgage interest deduction, which,
in turn, would cause less of a reduction in tax rates and slower
economic growth.
78
Phasing in the elimination of the mortgage interest deduction
over a period of years would be a better solution. 179 Eliminating
the deduction over a number of years gives the real estate and
construction industries time to adjust production because many
eliminated without the delay and windfall gains inherent in grandfathering prior
transactions."); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 509, 615-16 (1986) (concluding that generally, government transitional relief is
"undesirable" because it is inefficient). This Article does not take a position on whether
such reliance requires transition relief, but instead argues that transition relief is
necessary to address the short run negative effects of eliminating the mortgage interest
deduction.
172. See David I. Kempler, Transitional Rules as a Tool for Effective Tax Reform,
36 BAYLOR L. REV. 765, 774 (1984).
173. Eliminating the mortgage interest deduction makes it difficult for potential first-
time home buyers to afford a home. See supra text accompanying note 169. A direct
spending program, which would provide cash assistance to potential first-time home
buyers, could make up for the effects of eliminating the mortgage interest deduction.
See generally SURREY, supra note 128, at 179-80 (discussing how items in the Tax
Expenditures Budget can be structured as direct spending programs).
174. See Doernberg, supra note 163, at 479-80.
175. See Salsich, supra note 97, at 1635-36.
176. See AARON & GALPER, supra note 153, at 92 (arguing that even with a grandfa-
ther clause "prices of existing houses would still tend to fall").
177. See id.
178. See Kempler, supra note 172, at 795.
179. The deduction could be reduced by 10% each year for 10 years.
FALL 1996]
72 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 30:1
real estate projects develop over many years. In addition, the
adjustment period would allow homeowners to amortize the
benefit of the mortgage interest tax deduction over a period that
approximates the time between moves by the average homeown-
er.8 ° Finally, because most of the benefit of the mortgage
interest deduction accrues in the early years of a mortgage,
when interest payments exceed principal payments, a ten-year
phase-in period allows homeowners to enjoy most of the benefits
of the deduction while preparing for its elimination.
The drawback of a phase-in period, as with any transition
relief, is that it delays the implementation of the change.
Because revenue gains would not be as high in the early years,
the reduction in the tax rate would not be as large. In turn,
economic growth would be less robust. Nevertheless, a phase-in
should reduce the windfall losses in value from eliminating the
mortgage interest deduction without adding new inequities or
unnecessary complexity.
18 1
C. Changes in the Mortgage Interest Deduction
Given the political realities in this country and the widespread
public perception of home ownership as an intrinsic good, it may
be difficult to completely eliminate the deduction even in the
context of a comprehensive restructuring of the tax system.
Under such conditions, the next best solution is to reduce the
size and scope of the deduction.
1. Eliminate Deduction for Home Equity Indebtedness-As
discussed above in Part I, home equity indebtedness is limited
to $100,000 in debt secured by a qualified residence and used
for any purpose. 2 In enacting the 1986 Tax Act, Congress
criticized the then-current tax system for providing "an incentive
to invest in consumer durables rather than assets which produce
taxable income and, therefore, an incentive to consume rather
than save."'8 3 Congress concluded that personal interest should
not be deductible." The deduction for interest on home equity
180. See Salsich, supra note 97, at 1636.
181. See Kempler, supra note 172, at 795; Munzer, supra note 97, at 454-55.
182. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
183. S. REP. No. 99-313, at 804 (1986).
184. See 132 CONG. REc. 24154, 24453 (1986) ("Under the conference agreement,
personal interest is not deductible."); see also S. REP. NO. 99-313, at 804 (1986); H.R.
REP. No. 99-426, at 297 (1985).
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indebtedness, however, allows homeowners with equity built up
in their homes through repayment of mortgage principal or
appreciation in the value of the home to avoid the disallowance
of personal interest.185 In effect, the deduction "encourages
mortgaging homes to satisfy demand for consumption."186
The deduction of interest on home equity indebtedness also
creates horizontal inequities between homeowners with little or
no equity in their homes and renters on one side, and home-
owners with large amounts of equity in their homes on the
other.187 No rational policy justifies retaining a deduction for
interest on items bought to satisfy personal consumption needs
only because they are secured by equity in a home.8 8
2. Eliminate Deduction for Second Homes-No clear policy
justifies allowing homeowners to deduct mortgage interest on
second homes."8 9 When Congress fashioned the current rules for
the mortgage interest deduction, its stated goal was to foster
home ownership. 9 ° With few exceptions, though, second homes
are a luxury. 91 Because owners of second homes by definition
own homes, allowing a deduction for second homes could not
possibly increase the rate of home ownership. Consequently,
there is no reason to use scarce federal tax dollars to subsidize
the ownership of vacation homes for some middle- and upper-
income taxpayers. 92
185. See McMahon, supra note 18, at 487.
186. Id. at 488.
187. See McMahon, supra note 18, at 487-88 (including homeowners with little
equity in the group disfavored by the deduction); Snoe, supra note 25, at 491 (indicating
that the use of home equity loans may hamper sales of higher priced homes by causing
homeowners to deplete the equity in their homes for current consumption which
prevents them from trading up to a more expensive home).
188. See McMahon, supra note 18, at 487 ("The legislative history of the provisions
... provides no coherent explanation of the policy reasons underlying Congress's decision
to allow the deduction.").
189. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GUCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, & THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX REFORM 111 (1987)
(suggesting that the American Land Development Association and its lobbyist played
an influential role in the retention of the mortgage interest deduction for vacation
homes); Snoe, supra note 25, at 482 ("Unless Congress is convinced the vacation home
industry cannot prosper without the two qualified residence provisions, Congress should
limit the home mortgage interest deduction to principal residences.").
190. See supra note 3.
191. See McMahon, supra note 18, at 487 ("Second homes are virtually always a
luxury. There is absolutely no reason for subsidizing the ownership of vacation homes.").
192. See Snoe, supra note 25, at 480 ("Congress should reconsider allowing a
taxpayer to claim two qualified residences.").
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Not only does allowing a deduction for second homes not
further Congress' stated purpose, it also produces negative
economic effects. By reducing the cost of investing in a second
home compared to some other income producing asset, the
mortgage interest deduction creates an incentive for homeown-
ers to overconsume housing, which then has a negative influence
on the economy.'9 3
The fact that luxury pleasure boats can qualify as second
homes 9 4 highlights the utter disconnect between Congress'
stated goal of encouraging home ownership and the deductibility
of mortgage interest on second homes. Because no policy justifies
the retention of the deduction for second homes, the deduction
should be eliminated.
3. Reduce the Mortgage Interest Deduction-If the goal of the
mortgage interest deduction is to increase the number of home-
owners, then there "is no good reason whatsoever for allowing
a deduction for interest to purchase a home that costs many
times the median home price."'95 At present, the maximum
principal eligible for the mortgage interest deduction is $1.1
million.196 In 1994, the median sale price was $130,000 for a
new single family home and $109,800 for an existing single
family home. 97 Only California and Hawaii had statistical
areas with median sales prices of existing single family homes
above $200,000. 198 Most homeowning taxpayers, then, do not
use anywhere close to the full amount allowed.
Reducing the mortgage interest deduction is potentially more
politically palatable than eliminating it completely because such
a change would not affect most homeowners.' 99 The effects would
largely be restricted to owners of expensive homes, the value of
which would fall.200
193. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
194. See McMahon, supra note 18, at 487.
195. Id.
196. See supra Part I.
197. See 1995 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 88, at 730.
198. See id. at 731.
199. U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Pete Domenici have expressed support for
lowering the cap on mortgage interest deductions. See Pete V. Domenici, The
Unamerican Spirit of the Federal Income Tax, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 273, 294 (1994).
200. See DRI ANALYSIS, supra note 134, at 3-4. Reducing the size of the mortgage
interest deduction would also coincide with the practices of other countries. For example,
England allows taxpayers to deduct interest on home mortgage indebtedness up to a
maximum of £30,000 (about $50,000) of principal per year, which is substantially less
than the current limit of $1.1 million in the United States. See James C. Smith, The
Dynamics of Landlord-Tenant Law and Residential Finance: The Comparative Economics
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The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) suggests two methods
for reducing the mortgage interest deduction: reduce the maxi-
mum amount of principal eligible for the mortgage interest
deduction, or limit the amount of mortgage interest that taxpay-
ers can deduct from their returns.2 ' The major distinction
between these two approaches is that under the second, fluctua-
tions in interest rates would change the size mortgage that could
be supported.0 2
The CBO indicates that reducing the maximum principal
eligible for the mortgage interest deduction to $300,000 would
affect only about 1.2 million of the 28 million taxpayers who use
the mortgage interest deduction.0 3 Yet, it would increase
revenues by approximately $35 billion over five years. 20 4 Alterna-
tively, limiting the amount of mortgage interest a taxpayer could
deduct from their return to $20,000 would affect about 1.5
million of the 28 million taxpayers who claimed the mortgage
interest deduction.20 5 Based on current home mortgage interest
rates, a $20,000 cap would support a $225,000 mortgage, and
only 6% of new mortgages in 1994 exceeded $225,000.206 The
CBO estimates that the cap would raise $52 billion over five
years.20 7
While entirely eliminating the mortgage interest deduction is
preferable, there is no adequate justification for maintaining the
mortgage interest deduction in its present form. Because the
goal of the mortgage interest deduction is to expand home
ownership, it should be substantially reduced in size to concen-
trate its impact on new homeowners.
CONCLUSION
In 1986, Congress overhauled the tax code but retained the
mortgage interest deduction to promote home ownership. While
there are critics of the very goal of the mortgage interest
of Home Ownership, 44 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 41 (1993).
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deduction, home ownership has broad support among most
Americans. In an effort to expand home ownership, taxpayers
spend more than $50 billion a year on the mortgage interest
deduction alone.
Unfortunately, the mortgage interest deduction, particularly
in its current form, is inefficient, inequitable, and too costly. It
provides too much of its benefit to upper-income homeowners
and too little to low- and middle-income renters most of whom
want desperately to own their own home. Instead of increasing
the rate of home ownership, the mortgage interest deduction
exacerbates the inequalities caused by not including imputed net
rent as taxable income. In addition, the mortgage interest
deduction creates serious economic distortions that limit eco-
nomic growth and make our economy less efficient overall. The
American taxpayers are not getting very much for the huge
amount of money spent on the mortgage interest deduction.
The only completely effective solution to the inequalities
related to the tax treatment of housing is to tax imputed rent
as income and allow a corresponding deduction for mortgage
interest as an expense of producing the imputed rent. While
theoretically desirable, this solution is administratively daunting
and unlikely to be adopted by Congress. The next best solution,
then, is to eliminate the mortgage interest deduction phased-in
over ten years. This solution would create its own horizontal
inequities between cash homebuyers and mortgage homebuyers,
but it would bring the income tax base closer to a true measure
of economic income and reduce economic distortions.
If neither of these solutions proves politically attainable, the
size and scope of the deduction should, nevertheless, be reduced.
No clear justification exists for allowing a tax deduction for
interest on home equity indebtedness, second homes, or homes
costing well above the median home price. While admittedly
only partial solutions, these reductions in the mortgage interest
deduction would enhance tax equity, economic efficiency, and
federal revenues.
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TABLE 1
MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES SUPPORTING HOME OWNERSHIP
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
Tax Expenditure FY 1984" FY 1996"*
Mortgage Interest Deduction 28,335 54,165
Property Tax Deduction 9,645 15,680
Deferral of Capital Gains 2,515 17,850
One-time Exclusion of Capital Gains 865 4,920
*See ExECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 50
(1984).
**See 1996 BUDGET, supra note 4, at 40.
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